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PROVIDENCE, ETERNITY, AND
HUMAN FREEDOM: A REPLY TO
STUMP AND KRETZMANN
David Widerker

In this paper, I respond to Eleonore Stump's and Norman Kretzmann's defense of eternalism against an objection of mine in 'A Problem For the
Eternity Solution.' There I argued that, insofar as eternalism is intended as a
strategy of avoiding the conclusion of the argument against freedom from divine
foreknowledge to the effect that the traditional theist is committed to the violation
of the principle of the fixity of the past, it does not succeed. I discuss two attempts
by Stump and Kretzmann to reject this claim and argue that they are unsatisfactory. Finally, I sketch what seems to me the most promising line of defence that
an eternalist might adopt in order to deal with the problem I raise.

There is a well-known argument which purports to show that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom.l The argument proceeds
from the assumption that God has foreknowledge of all facts to the conclusion
that if humans are free to do otherwise than what they in fact do, then thy
also have power to bring about the non-obtaining of certain facts about the
past, specifically, facts regarding God's foreknowledge of how a free agent
acts in the future. Since this conclusion constitutes a violation of the principle
of the fixity of the past (henceforth "PFP"), it is concluded that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are incompatible. One way of resisting this
argument, sometimes referred to as "The Eternity Solution" is to deny the
assumption that God has foreknowledge of facts. The eternalist claims that
God exists outside time, and hence is not subject to temporal predication.
Although God does not have foreknowledge, he still is omniscient. But the
mode of his knowledge is atemporaI.2 This being the case, the eternalist
contends that the only conclusion that one is justified to draw from the fact
that human agents can act otherwise, is that such agents have it within their
power to bring about the non-obtaining of certain atemporal facts regarding
God's (atemporal) knowledge of how such agents act at a given point in time.
And this conclusion does not violate PFP.
In an earlier article,3 I presented a difficulty for the Eternity Solution. I
argued that given a certain plausible assumption regarding God's providential
activity in the world:
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It is logically possible for God sometimes to intervene in human history in the light of his knowledge of future contingent events,

the proponent of the Eternity Solution still seems to be committed to the
violation of PFP. My argument was this.
Suppose that God knows that Jack freely pulls the trigger at TS, with the
intention of killing Smith. Suppose further that wanting to save Smith, God
reveals this fact to Smith at T3 by causing him to hear at T3 a voice telling
him about what is going to happen. As a result, Smith by taking appropriate
precautions is able to save his life. Now the etemalist concedes that if Jack
has it within his power at T4 to refrain from his attempt to kill Smith, he also
has the power at T4 to make it the case that God does not know that he
attempts to kill Smith at TS. On the other hand, we may assume that God's
knowing that Jack attempts to kill Smith at TS is a condition which, in the
circumstances, is causally necessary for the occurrences of the event of
Smith's hearing at T3 a voice telling him that Jack will attempt to kill him.
It seems plausible to suppose that had God not known that Jack attempts to
kill Smith at TS, he would not have told Smith that Jack will try to kill him,
and hence, Smith would not have heard the voice he in fact heard. 4 But then
it follows that by having the power to bring about the non-obtaining of that
condition, Jack can also be said to have the power at T4 to bring about the
non-obtaining of such genuine past facts as:
XT3: That Smith heard at T3 a voice telling him that Jack will attempt to
kill him.
YT3: That Smith came to believe at T3 that Jack will attempt to kill him, etc.
The intuitive principle underlying the last inference is this:
If P is the case, and q is a causally necessary condition (in the circumstances)
for p, and an agent X has it within his power at T to make it the case that
(not-q), then X has it also within his power at T to make it the case that
(not-p).
An assumption such as (1) seems to me to be acceptable on intuitive grounds.
It seems to me plausible to assume that God has the power to warn Smith
against Jack's attempt to kill him, without this having the consequence that,
in case He exercises this power, Jack's attempt to kill Smith ceases to be a
free action. I also claimed that (1) seems to get support from various cases
of biblical prophecy.s

I
In a recent article,6 Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (henceforth
referred to as 'S-K') have responded to my objection. In their reply, they are
concerned with a somewhat restricted version of (1), i.e.
(1')

It is logically possible for God sometimes to intervene in human his-

tory in the light of his knowledge of a certain future contingent event,
and tell a human agent about the occurrence of that event.
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They seem to agree with me that the acceptance of (1') commits the etemalist
to the violation of PFP. Their way out is to reject (1') by way of adopting
(2) Necessarily, whenever God reveals to a human agent that a certain event

(state of affairs) will occur in the future, the prophecy renders that event
inevitable. '
Now S-K are aware of the fact that prima Jacie endorsing (2) commits them
to the undesirable result that biblical prophecy threatens human freedom in
the sense that
(D) All prophesied human actions in the Scriptures tum out to be inevitable,
and hence are unfree in the sense of freedom required for moral responsibility.
They propose two ways of dealing with this difficulty. The fIrst way is to say that
Rl. Biblical prophecies involving human actions are stated in a general way,
and hence do not render any particular action of an agent inevitable. s
As an example, they mention the following prophecy from the book of Daniel.
"And in the latter time of their kingdom, when the transgressors are come to
the full, a king of fierce countenance, and understanding dark sentences shall
stand up. And his power shall be mighty, but not by his own power: and he
shall destroy wonderfully, and shall prosper and practise, and shall destroy
the mighty and the holy people." (Daniel 8: 23-24)
This prophecy which is of the form:
It will be the case that some king performs some action at some time,

leaves vague the identity of the king. the place and time of his action, etc.,
and hence fails to identify a particular action of the agent. To be sure, we do
have in the Scriptures also prophecies which are less vague, prophecies of
the form: An agent S will perform an act of type V, during the time-interval

T. E.g.,
"Yet within three days shall Pharaoh lift up thine head, and restore thee unto
thy place: and thou shalt deliver Pharaoh's cup into his hand after the former
manner when thou wast his butler." (Genesis 40:13)9
But such prophecies too, claim S-K, need not render inevitable any particular
action of the agent. Thus, instead of restoring the chief butler to his former
office in the way he actually did, Pharaoh could have refrained from performing that particular act, and done the restoring at a different time, or at another
place, or he could have done it using different words.lO
S-K's second response to (D) is to reject it by claiming that
R2. Although a prophecy may render the prophesied act inevitable, this does
not imply that it renders the act unfree. ll
S-K back this contention by suggesting the following account of the notion
of a free action.
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An action A is afree action of an agent S, just in case:
FA 1. The volition on which S acts in doing A is an instance of free
will on S's part.
FA2. In doing A, S is doing what he wants to do when he wants to do
it.
A volition is an effective desire or want which moves the agent all
the way to action.
A volition V is an instance of free will just in case:
FWI. V is not causally determined; and
FW2. V is S's own volition.

These two conditions are to be understood, according to S-K, in the following
way: (FWl) V is not causally determined only if V is not the result of an unbroken
causal sequence that (a) originates in something other than S's own beliefs and
desires and that (b) makes V unavoidable for S. (FW2) V is S's own only if (a)
S's intellect represents the state of affairs that becomes the object of V (under
some description) as a good to be pursued by S at that time and (b) S forms V
in consequence of that representation on the part of S's intellectP

Thus, to count as a free action, according to S-K, an action need not be
avoidable. 13 What is needed is that it stem from a volition that is an instance
of a free will and satisfy FA2. Such a volition itself may, of course, be
avoidable. But S-K stress that it need not be, i.e. its being unavoidable is,
according to them, compatible with its being an instance of free will. 14

II
I turn now to the examination of these two responses to (D). Consider first
Rl. It amounts, as we can see, to the claim that biblical prophecy does not
threaten the avoidability of the prophesied action qua particular action or
qua act-token. Now how exactly does this claim provide an answer to the
problem posed by (D)? If it is meant to be a refutation of (D), then it does
not succeed, since it is compatible with (D). The reason for this is that RI
focuses on the avoidability of an act qua act-token, whereas the unavoidability intended in (D) is that of an act under a given description, the description
of the act as specified in the prophecy. IS In other words, (D) was not intended
to mean that if there is a prophecy to the effect that an agent S will perform
an act of type V during T, then the act-token satisfying OS's V-ing during T'
is unavoidable, but rather that it is unavoidable that S will V during T. But
perhaps S-K intended RI to be a response to (D) only from the vantage point
of the avoidabilist, i.e., someone who takes avoidability to be a necessary
condition for freedom and moral responsibility, thus subscribing to
(PAP)

A person is morally responsible for an action he performed only if
he could have avoided performing it.
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That is, perhaps S-K's intention was to claim that, though they themselves
reject avoidabilism, the problem I raise in connection with (D) can be answered even by an avoidabilist? Of course, if this line of argument is to be
successful, it must be supplemented by the assumption that, contrary to what
is assumed by (D), the sort of avoidability required for an agent's moral
responsibility for his act is that of the act qua act-token. But would this
assumption be acceptable to an avoidabilist? The answer is negative. When
concerned with moral responsibility we are concerned with questions of
moral praise and blame. Now an agent is morally blameworthy for an act he
performed only insofar as that act was of a type that is morally wrong (i.e.,
of a type such that it is morally wrong to perform an act of that type). This
means that from the point of view of the avoidabilist the issue of an agent's
being morally blameworthy for his act hinges crucially on the question
whether in the circumstances the agent could have refrained from acting in
a morally wrong way. Clearly, then, for the avoidabilist the notion of avoidability that is pertinent to moral responsibility is not that of an action qua
act-token, but rather that of an action under a given description, the description in virtue of which the act may be deemed morally right or wrong. This
last point can be also brought out by the following example. Suppose that
Jack was hypnotized to kill Smith on August 7, at 5:32 pm, and in fact did
so. Suppose also that the time mentioned is the exact time of the action.
According to the avoidabilist, Jack would not be morally blameworthy for
killing Smith. Given the hypnosis, he could not have refrained from performing a morally wrong act. But note that qua act-token his act was avoidable.
For instead of strangling Smith, as he actually did, Jack could have killed
him in some other way, e.g. by stabbing him, and that would be a different
act-token from the one he actually performed.
A perhaps more plausible version of S-K's first response from the point of
view of the avoidabilist would be the following:
Rl'.

Biblical prophecies are stated vaguely in that they do not specify
the exact time of the prophesied action. Consequently, a prophecy
of the form "S will perform an act-type V during the time interval",
though rendering it inevitable that S will V during T, need not render
inevitable S's V-ing at T', where T' is the exact time at which S V-s
during T.16

On this account, a prophecy issued on August 1/92, saying that
(3) Jack will kill Smith on August 7/92,

renders it inevitable that Jack kills Smith on August 7/92. But it need not
render inevitable Jack's killing Smith at 5:32 pm, on that day; and Jack may
still be held responsible for the latter. The problem, however, with this proposal is that it does not work for prophecies involving omissions. For consider, for example, a prophecy (issued on February 1/92) which says that
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(4) Jack will not kill Smith on March 1/1992.

If a particular instantiation of Jack's not killing Smith on the said date were
avoidable, say his not killing him at 5:32 pm, it would follow that it was
within Jack's power to kill Smith on March 1. But this would be in contradiction with the alleged inevitability of (4). In other words, the assumption
underlying Rl', that the unavoidability of a given dated state of affairs does
not entail the unavoidability of a temporally more determinate state of affairs
of the same sort, does not hold for omissions. And since we do have in the
Scriptures many examples of prophecies involving omissions, Rl', as a general thesis regarding biblical prophecy, is false.17
Let us consider now S-K's second response to (D), R2. As noted earlier,
the idea behind it is to resist (D) by maintaining that inevitability does not
imply lack of freedom in the sense of freedom required for moral responsibility. This latter sort of freedom, according to S-K, is captured by (FSK) and
does not require avoidability or freedom to do otherwise as a necessary
condition. On this view, although an action may be rendered inevitable by a
certain prophecy, it might still be an action for which the agent may be held
responsible; for it may stem from a volition which is an instance of free will
on the agent's part. To be sure, the problem of reconciling divine foreknowledge with human freedom, as it is usually raised, is formulated in terms of
freedom in the sense of freedom to do otherwise. And, indeed, it was this
notion of freedom that I was concerned with in my paper. Still, the move
made by S-K in R2 is an interesting one, and it behooves us to see whether
it provides the eternalist with an adequate response to my objection to the
Eternity Solution.
Its ingenuity notwithstanding, R2 proves unsatisfactory. One weakness of
it is that it leads to consequences that are theologically suspect. Imagine, for
example, that God reveals to some prophet that when no one will be around
Jack will severely harm Billy, who is an innocent child. Suppose further that
Jack does so willingly for the sake of fun, and that his volition to do so is
avoidable. (This last assumption is justified in view of S-K's explicit stipulation that, on (FSK), the fact that an action is inevitable does not imply that
the volition on which the agent acts is inevitable.) Then, it follows, given the
alleged inevitability of the prophesied action, that Jack would find himself
harming Billy, even if he had resolved not to do so. This consequence seems
to me problematic taking into account God's essential goodness and wisdom.
To point to a related difficulty, consider God's prophecy to Moses that the
King of Egypt will not let the Israelites go (Ex. 3: 19). By considerations
similar to those cited above, it can be shown that even if Pharaoh had made
the opposite decision, he would be prevented from carrying it out, and would
still have to return a negative answer to Moses. This would go against the
standard view that, at least in his first encounters with Moses, Pharaoh had
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a choice as to whether or not to let the Israelites go. IS Or, to take a case from
the Christian theological tradition, consider Jesus's well-known prophecy that
Peter will deny him three times. "And Jesus saith unto him, Verily I say unto
thee, this day, even this night, before the cock crows twice, thou shalt deny
me thrice" (Mark 14: 30). Again it can be shown that, on the account suggested by S-K, Peter would have to deny Christ even if he had resolved not
to deny him.19 Consequences like these seem to me to be theologically implausible. In response to this objection S-K may argue that if Peter had not
willed to deny Christ, then Christ, knowing this, would not have told Peter
that he would do so. (Similarly also in Pharaoh's and in Jack's case.) But this
would be to attribute to Peter power over the past. For if the fact of Christ's
telling Peter about the latter's denial is contingent upon whether or not Peter
wills to deny Christ, then Peter, by having the power to refrain from willing
to deny Christ, can be said to have the power to bring it about that Christ did
not reveal to him in the past what he in fact did. 20
But R2 is open to a more serious criticism. We have seen earlier that in
their formulation of R2 Stump and Kretzmann employ a notion of freedom
that is independent of avoidability. This move enabled them to claim, contrary
to (D), that the fact that a prophecy renders the prophesied action unavoidable
does not imply that it renders it unfree (in the sense of freedom pertinent to
moral responsibility). But notice that once the meaning of 'free action' has
been changed in this way, the Eternity Solution loses its significance as a
bona fide solution to the freedom-divine omniscience problem. For when
faced with the incompatibilist argument, it is open now for the proponent of
foreknowledge to reply that all that this argument shows is that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with the agent's act being avoidable, but not with
its being a free act in the sense of (FSK). Thus, there is no need to embrace
the Eternity Solution in order to solve the freedom-foreknowledge problem.
Indeed, the problem does not arise in the first place. The only response that
I can envisage at this point, on behalf of S-K, would be to claim that a God
who has foreknowledge would also foreknow the agent's volitions and this
fact would render the agent's actions unfree in the sense of (FSK). I.e.
(5) If God were to foreknow an agent's volition to perform a certain action,
the action associated with that volition would not be a free action.
But such a claim is far from being self-evident. To see this, let us examine it
more carefully. Let A be a given act of Jack, and let VA be the volition on
which Jack acts. Also, let us assume that condition FA2 of S-K's account of
free action is satisfied, i.e., that in doing A, Jack is doing what he wants to
do when he wants to do it. (This assumption is certainly consistent with God's
foreknowing VA.) Now if, as (5) implies, God's foreknowing VA renders his
action unfree, then it must be the case that condition FAI of their account is
not satisfied, which means that VA is either causally determined, or that it is
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not Jack's own volition in the sense that it is not formed as a consequence of
Jack's intellect representing the object of VA as a good. In other words, the
plausibility of (5) requires the truth of
(6)

If God foreknows VA, then either VA is causally determined, or VA is
not Jack's own volition.

But why should one accept (6)? Why couldn't one conceive of a possible
world in which although God foreknows VA, VA is not causally determined
is Jack's own volition? First, God's foreknowledge of VA does not seem to
contradict the fact that VA is Jack's own volition. As Stump points out elsewhere, when VA is an agent's own volition, the intellect moves the will not
as an efficient cause but as a final cause. 21 And this fact seems to be compatible with God's foreknowledge of VA. Secondly, why assume that
(7)

God's foreknowing VA entails that VA is causally determined.

This claim is extremely controversial. It would, for example, be rejected by
many theological compatibilists who believe that at least some of our volitions or actions, though foreknown by God, are not causally determined.
Finally, even if (7) were true, one may wonder why a similar claim does not
hold for God's atemporal knowledge, in which case, the appeal to a God who
exists outside time would prove useless for solving the freedom-foreknowledge problem.

III
In concluding my discussion of Rl and R2, I would like to comment briefly
on a recent criticism of these responses by Edward Wierenga. 22 Wierenga
argues against Rl that it does not work for prophecies which describe the
agent's activity in considerable detail. In such cases, he claims, general inevitability implies particular inevitability. So for example, in a case where a
prophecy prophesies that
(3)

Jack will kill Smith on August 7/92,

and where
(3a) Jack's particular action of killing Smith,
occurs at 5:32 pm, on that day, Wierenga's view is that the (alleged) inevitability of the former implies the inevitability of the latter. His argument for
this contention is the following: Either (3) is rendered inevitable by way of
some causal or deterministic mechanism, or it is not. If it is, then that mechanism would also render inevitable Jack's actual killing of Smith at 5:32 pm.
If it is not, then he cannot see how (3) can be deemed inevitable. Hence,
according to him, Rl is false. Wierenga employs a similar argument also
against R2. He claims that if, as shown above, the inevitability of Jack's
actual killing of Smith requires the existence of some causal mechanism that
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renders the killing inevitable, then that very same mechanism would also
render inevitable the volition associated with the killing, in which case, the
killing would not be a free action in S-K's sense (i.e., in the sense of FSK).
Consequently, the claim made in R2 that an action might be inevitable, and
yet be a free action is implausible. 23 In my view, both these arguments by
Wierenga are questionable. First, assuming that there is some causal mechanism M that ensures the inevitability of Jack's actual killing of Smith at 5:32
pm, it does not follow from this that M also causes Jack's volition to kill
Smith. For the action in question may be overdetermined by both the volition
and M. Secondly, I wish to claim that a state of affairs such as (3) may be
inevitable without there being at work any causal mechanism that renders
Jack's actual killing of Smith at 5:32 pm inevitable. To see this we only need
to conceive of a situation in which the inevitability of (3) is guaranteed by
the existence of some agent B who is such, that were he to detect that Jack
does not kill Smith until 10:00 pm on August 7, he would force Jack to do
so immediately thereafter. In such a situation, if Jack kills Smith on his own
at 5:32 pm, then despite the fact that (3) is inevitable, Jack's actual act of
killing Smith need not be causally determined. 24

IV
Can the eternalist formulate an adequate reply to my objection to the Eternity
Solution? In my original article,25 I made it clear that my objection was
intended against a specific type of eternalist position; one that treats the
principle of the fixity of the past, PFP, as a conceptual truth and views the
move of conceiving of God as existing outside time as a way of avoiding the
violation of PFP to which the incompatibilist argument leads. We can, however, imagine also a different version of eternalism (call it "eternalism2") that
does not presuppose the truth of PFP. The proponent of this version is openminded with regard to possible violations of PFP, provided he can account
for them, i.e., provided he can explain how in the specific case the agent can
be said to have power over the past, without assuming backward causation.
Now the eternalist2 does have a reply to my objection which, in my view, is
non-trivial and is worth considering. When faced with the conclusion of the
objection to the effect that
it was within Jack's power at T4 to bring about the non-obtaining of a past
fact such as XT3: That Smith heard at T3 a voice telling him that Jack will
attempt to kill him,

the eternalist2 might claim that in the case of XT3 the violation of PFP is
harmless. The reason for this is that XT3, unlike regular past facts such as
e.g., Hitler's attack on Poland in 1939, has as one of the conditions which
are causally necessary for its obtaining an atemporal fact that Jack has power
over, i.e., God's knowing that Jack attempts to kill Smith at T5, etc. And since
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Jack has it within his power to bring about the non-obtaining of that fact, he
also can be said to have it within his power to bring about the non-occurrence
of XT3. More generally, the strategy that may be adopted by the eternalist2
when it comes to the question whether an agent can be said to have the power
to bring about the non-occurrence of a past fact (event) F is to ask how that
past fact came about. If its occurrence is partially due to the obtaining of an
atemporal fact, there seems to be no reason why someone who has the power
to bring about the non-obtaining of that atemporal fact may not be credited
with the power to bring about the non-occurrence of F. These considerations
lead to the following amendment of the principle of the fixity of the past from
the point of view of the eternalist2:
(PFP1) For any fact F, time T, and agent S, if F is a genuine fact about the
past, relative to T, then, unless S has at T power over an atemporal
causally necessary condition of F, it is not it within S's power at T
to bring about the non-obtaining of F.

Conclusion
S-K's proposal of how an eternalist might escape the objection I raised to the
Eternity Solution appears to commit them to the theologically undesirable
result of having to treat all prophesied human actions in Scripture as unavoidable, and hence as unfree. In this paper, I have examined two attempts by
S-K to respond to this difficulty. Their first response turns out to be either
irrelevant to it, or else involves an assumption that is unacceptable to the
avoidabilist, i.e., that moral responsibility for an act requires its avoidability
qua act-token. As for their second response, we saw that, aside from being
subject to theological difficulties, it employs a notion of freedom that is
irrelevant to the divine foreknowledge-freedom conflict as traditionally formulated, and one for which this problem does not arise. As a result, the
Eternity Solution loses its significance as a bonafide solution to that problem.
A defence of the Eternity Solution that renders it superfluous in this sense
would be self-defeating from the eternalist viewpoint. Lastly, I outlined what
seems to me to be the most promising line of defense that an eternalist might
adopt to deal with the objection I raise. To be sure, this line involves weakening the principle of the fixity of the past. However, since it achieves this
weakening in a non-arbitrary way, it is a position that is worth exploring. 26
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NOTES
1. For a well-known presentation of this argument, see Nelson Pike's "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action," The Philosophical Review 74 (1965), pp. 27-46. Pike's
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argument is extensively treated in John M. Fischer (ed.) God, Freedom and Knowledge
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).
2. Classical proponents of this view are Boethius and Aquinas. See Boethius Consolation of Philosophy Book 5, sec. 4-6, and St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae Part I,
Question 10. Among its modem expounders we may find Eleonore Stump and Norman
Kretzmann, "Eternity," The Journal ofPhilosophy 78 (1981), pp. 429-58, David B. Burell,
"God's Eternity," Faith and Philosophy 1 (1984), pp. 389-406, and Brian Leftow, Time
and Eternity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
3. "A Problem for the Eternity Solution," International Journal for the Philosophy of
Religion 29 (1991), pp. 87-95.
4. I assume that God (qua an absolutely perfect being) is absolutely trustworthy, in the
sense that it is impossible for him to lie.
5. Ibid., pp. 92-93.
6. "Prophecy, Past Truth, and Eternity," Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991), pp.
395-424.
7. Ibid., section 4. I shall understand the notion of a prophecy rendering an event (state
of affairs) inevitable, as employed by S-K, simply as meaning that the fact that the
prophecy says that a certain event will occur, implies that the event is inevitable.
8. Ibid., section 4. S-K hold Rl only in the case of categorical biblical prophecies.
9. For other biblical examples of such prophecies, see 1 Kings 14:5, and Mark 14:30.
10. Ibid., p. 401. Stump and Kretzmann use a different example from the one cited in
the text. To judge from the examples they give, S-K seem to adopt a coarse-grained account
of action-individuation of the sort espoused by Anscombe and Davidson.
11. Ibid., section 4, see especially pp. 402-3.
12. Ibid., section 3. The explication of 'volition' as an effective desire or want which
moves the agent all the way to action, is due to Harry Frankfurt. See his "Freedom of the
Will and the Concept of a Person," The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), pp. 05-20. I
assume that this is also how S-K use this term. See Stump and Kretzmann op. cit., footnote
14, and Stump's, "Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free
Will," The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), p. 396.
13. Following Harry Frankfurt, S-K reject the principle of alternate possibilities.
(PAP) A person S is morally responsible for an action he performed only if
he could have avoided performing it.
(Harry Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," The Journal of
Philosophy 66 (1969), pp. 828-39.) The debate over the truth of PAP is a complicated one,
and I do not intend to go into it in the present article. In what follows, I shall try to assess
the plausibility of R2 independently of this issue. Just to show that the rejection of PAP
is not all that innocent, let us note that the moral blame version of PAP, i.e.
(PAPB) An agent S is morally blameworthy for performing a given act A only
if it was within S's power not to perform A,
is entailed by the Kantian thesis that "ought implies can,"
(K)
An agent S has a moral obligation to perform (not to perform) an act
A only if S has it within his power to perform (not to perform) A,
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given the following intuitive assumption:
(MB) An agent S is morally blameworthy for performing a given act A only
if S had a moral obligation not to perform A.
Hence, a theist who rejects the principle of alternate possibilities wold also have to reject
the Kantian thesis. This consequence would certainly be unwelcome to many theists. I
discuss the relation between the Kantian principle and PAP in my "Frankfurt on 'Ought
Implies Can' and Alternate Possibilities," Analysis 51 (1991). For a collection of articles
that discuss Frankfurt's attack on PAP, see John M. Fischer, Moral Responsibility (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1986), part II.
14. Thus, they say explicitly, "Conditions FWI and FW2 also do not entail a weaker
form of the principle of alternate possibilities, that an agent who acts with free will could
always will otherwise than she wills." Stump and Kretzmann, op. cit., p. 399.
15. The notion of the avoidability of an act qua act-token may be explicated as follows.
An act A performed by an agent S at a time T was avoidable for S qua act-token, iff there
is an essential property P of A such that it was within S's power before T to bring it about
that it is not the case that A exemplifies P. On the other hand, an act A can be said to be
avoidable for S under the description 'S's V-ing at T,' iff it satisfies that description, and
S could have refrained from V-ing at T.
16. The proponent of Rl' will want to hold this thesis with the exception that T' is the
not the last time-moment at which S can still exemplify V during T.
17. For examples of biblical prophecies involving omissions, see Exodus 3:19 and 7:14,
Isaiah 37: 33-34, etc.
18. That Pharaoh had this choice is clearly indicated by the fact that Moses is repeatedly
ordered by God to warn Pharaoh that if he will not let the Israelites go, severe disasters
will be brought upon Egypt. (See for example Ex. 8:1-2, 20-21, and Ex. 9:1-2, etc.) It
would be pointless or at least very misleading to give Pharaoh such warnings if he lacked
the power to let the Israelites go. Note that the objection cited in the text is independent
of the problem of God's hardening Pharaoh's heart discussed by Stump in her interesting
article 'Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will,' The
Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), pp. 395-420. The objection addresses the counterintuitive consequences of the alleged inevitability of Pharaoh's refusal to let the Israelites
go in the light of an earlier prophecy to this effect in Ex. 3:19. And it applies to those
cases in which, according to Stump, Pharaoh's heart was hardened by Pharaoh himself,
and not by God. (See Stump, ibid., p. 419.)
19. S-K point out (fn. 20 of their article) that, on their account of freedom, Peter's case
is one in which the agent acts with free will, but has no freedom of action, since in the
actual scenario Peter does not do what he wants to do, i.e., FAI without FA2. But this
observation leaves untouched the problem I raise in the text.
20. A defender of S-K might argue at this point that all my objection shows is that Peter
has only "counterfactual power over the past" (i.e., the power to do something such that,
had he done it, Christ would not have uttered the prophecy that he in fact uttered) and not,
as I claim, the power to bring it about that a certain fact about the past would not have
obtained. To establish the latter claim, I would have to make use of a certain principle that
William Hasker has called "power entailment principle," i.e. (P) If P entails Q, and it is
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not the case that Q, then it is within S's power at time T to bring it about that P only if it
is within S's power at T to bring it about that Q. Yet such a principle is deemed
controversial.
Reply: The above response is not open to S-K, since they accept the said power
entailment principle, as evidenced by the fact that they endorse a standard version of the
argument against freedom to act otherwise from divine foreknowledge, in which such a
principle (or a version thereof) is explicitly assumed (see sec. 2 and fn. 2 and 9 of their
article). Hence, S-K are committed to the claim made in the text regarding Peter having
the power to bring it about that Christ would not have uttered the prophecy that he in fact
uttered. As for myself, I do not find a principle such as (p) problematic. For a defense of
it, see my "Two Forms of Fatalism" in John M. Fischer (ed.) God, Freedom and Knowledge (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 98-100, and William Hasker's God,
Time and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 112-15. Hasker's
formulation of (p) differs slightly from mine.
21. Eleonore Stump, "Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept
of Free Will," The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), pp. 399-400.
22. Edward Wierenga, "Prophecy, Freedom and the Necessity of the Past," Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991), pp. 425-45. See especially section 7.
23. Ibid., p. 437.
24. To prevent complications introduced by the possibility of Jack's being killed before
August 7, we need to assume that in the situation under consideration the possibility of
Jack's killing Smith at any time until 10:00 pm on that day, is guaranteed as well.
25. Widerker, op. cit., p. 88 and p. 93.
26. I would like to thank Dale Gottlieb, Jerome Gellman, David Heyd, Daniel Statman,
Eli White, Eddy Zemach and most especially Norman Kretzmann, Eleonore Stump,
Jonathan Malino, Charlotte Katzoff and the referees of Faith and Philosophy, for excellent
comments on an earlier version of this paper.

